



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>373. Interior or Hidden Life. Charles Lane.
 379. Pindar. (Note and translations.) H. D. Thoreau.
 391. The Preaching of Buddha. (Selections.) H. D. Thoreau.
 401. Eros. R. W. Emerson.
 402. Ethnical Scriptures. Hermes Trismegistus. H. D. Thoreau.</p> | <p>405. The Times. A Fragment. R. W. Emerson.
 407. Critical Notices.
 407. Child's Letters from New York.
 407. Channing's Present.
 407. Hopkins's Address.
 408. Deutsche Schnellpost.</p> |
|--|---|

NUMBER FOUR.

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>409. Immanuel Kant. J. Elliot Cabot.
 415. Life in the Woods. Charles Lane.
 425. The Emigrants. From Freiligrath. Charles T. Brooks.
 427. The Youth of the Poet and Painter. (Continued.) W. E. Channing.
 455. The Twin Loves. Samuel G. Ward.
 458. Dialogue. Margaret Fuller.
 469. The Consolers. Samuel G. Ward.
 470. To Readers. W. E. Channing.
 471. The Death of Shelley. W. E. Channing.
 472. A Song of the Sea. W. E. Channing.
 473. To the Poets. W. E. Channing.</p> | <p>473. Fourierism. E. P. Peabody.
 484. The Young American. R. W. Emerson.
 507. Herald of Freedom. H. D. Thoreau.
 513. Fragments of Pindar (trans.). H. D. Thoreau.
 515. The Tragic. R. W. Emerson.
 521. Saturday and Sunday among the Creoles.
 525. The Moorish Prince. From Freiligrath. C. T. Brooks.
 528. The Visit. R. W. Emerson.
 529. Ethnical Scriptures. Chaldean Oracles.
 537. Millennial Church. Charles Lane.
 540. Notice of "Human Nature."</p> |
|---|--|

NOTE.—I am desirous of completing and perfecting the list of contributors to "The Dial," and shall be thankful for any help to that end. Those who can furnish information may address me at West Dedham, Mass. I also desire further information about the lesser-known contributors. Any errors into which I have fallen I wish to correct.

G. W. C.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF G. W. F. HEGEL, BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

III.

The Relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the Present Principle of Religious Consciousness.

If in our own days philosophy is attacked on account of its inquiry into religion, it will not cause us any astonishment if we consider the general characteristic of the times. Whoever tries to occupy himself with the recognition of God and to comprehend his nature through thinking must expect either to be ignored or to be subjected to individual or joint attacks.

The more the cognition of finite things has spread on account of the almost unbounded growth of science through which all departments of knowledge have been expanded beyond the individual horizon, the more has the circle of the science of God been narrowed. There was a time when all knowledge was a knowledge of God. The characteristic of our own time, on the contrary, is that it knows each and every thing, that it knows a mul-

titude of facts, but knows nothing of God. Formerly intelligence [der Geist] found its highest interest in its knowledge of God, and in fathoming his nature. In this occupation alone it found rest; it felt unhappy when it could not satisfy this craving. The spiritual struggles which the cognition of God calls forth within us were the highest that our spirit knew and experienced within itself; all other kinds of interest and knowledge were held in light esteem. Our time has appeased this need, these endeavors and struggles; we have done with them, they are disposed of. What Tacitus said of the ancient Germans, that they were *securi adversus deos*, we also have become in regard to cognition—*securi adversus deum*.

Our age no longer grieves that it lacks [philosophic] cognition of God; on the contrary, it is considered the highest wisdom to hold that no such knowledge is possible. What the Christian religion declares to be the highest, absolute commandment—"Ye shall know God"—is looked upon as folly. Christ says: "Be ye perfect even as your father which is in heaven is perfect." This high injunction is a word devoid of meaning for the wisdom of the present day. It has made of God an infinite spectre, dwelling in the distance; and it has likewise made human cognition a vain spectre of finitude by considering it a kind of mirror which reflects naught but unreal shades or phenomena. How, then, is it possible that we should honor and understand the command, "Be ye perfect even as your father in heaven," if we have no cognition of the Perfect, if our knowledge and will are therefore strictly limited to [the] phenomena [of experience], and if truth is made absolutely transcendent, a something which belongs to the [unattainable] world beyond? We should like to ask what there is that is worth while to understand if God is unintelligible?

If this standpoint is judged by its content, it must be looked upon as the lowest level of man's degradation, notwithstanding that he seems to take pride in occupying it because he imagines that he has proved that it is the highest point [of knowledge] that is attainable for him, and is therefore his true position. Although such a standpoint is diametrically opposed to the grand nature of Christian religion, which commands us to know God, his nature and essence, and to hold such knowledge in the highest esteem (the distinction whether this knowledge is the result of faith, au-

thority, revelation, or reason is here irrelevant), and although this standpoint has done with the content of the divine nature which is conveyed by revelation, as well as with [the claims of] reason, its blind presumption is such that it does not hesitate to turn in every one of its lower ramifications against philosophy, notwithstanding the fact that the latter is the means of freeing the spirit from that disgraceful degradation and of extricating religion from the position which that standpoint assigned to it and in which it has suffered greatly. And yet this class of theologians, who feel at home in that standpoint of vanity only, have ventured to arraign philosophy and charge it with destructive tendencies—theologians who no longer possess in themselves any content which could be destroyed. In order to refute these objections—which are not only groundless, but also frivolous and unscrupulous—we need but look at what [this class of] theologians have done to dissolve what is [real and] definite (*das Bestimmte*) in religion: (1) either by placing the dogmas in the background or by speaking of them as indifferent matters, and (2) by looking upon them as categories made and used by somebody else, and as transitory events in a history that is past. And after having thus contemplated the content, and having found that it is restored by philosophy and rendered safe from the devastation of theology, we shall (3) reflect upon the form of that standpoint and discover that the view which attacks philosophy in regard to form knows so little about itself as to ignore that it contains within itself, potentially and implicitly, the very principle of philosophy.

1. PHILOSOPHY AND THE INDIFFERENCE WITH WHICH CONCRETE
DOGMAS ARE LOOKED UPON AT PRESENT.

If philosophy in its relation to religion is charged with lowering the content of religion, and more particularly of Christian religion, and with destroying and corrupting the dogmas of the latter, these objections have been removed by modern theology itself. There are but few dogmas of the former system of Christian creeds left in the position of importance which was formerly conceded to them, and no other dogma has taken their place. Anybody can convince himself easily of this by considering the actual esteem paid to dogmas of the Church at present, and by remembering that in the religious world an almost universal indifference pre-

vails in regard to doctrines of faith which were formerly held to be essential. Some examples will show this. Christ is still made a centre of faith in his quality as mediator and redeemer; yet what was formerly called the work of redemption has assumed a very prosaic, merely psychological signification, and the essential part of the old church doctrine has been obliterated, although the edifying words are retained.

"Great energy of character, steadfastness in the conviction, for which he would willingly give his life"—these are the general categories through which Christ is dragged down to the general level of human action (although not of common every-day action); he is placed within the sphere of such actions as even heathens like Socrates were capable of. There is no doubt that, with many who hold this view, Christ remains the centre of faith and worship in a deeper sense, but it is nevertheless true that on the whole this [special] view limits Christianity to this direction of worship, and neglects or fails to attach the proper importance to the dogmas of the Trinity, of the Resurrection of the body, and to the miracles in the Old and New Testaments. The divinity of Christ, the dogmatic factor, that which is the distinguishing and peculiar characteristic of the Christian religion, is put aside or reduced to a generalization. Not only rationalism does this, but even the more pious theologians. The latter agree with the former in saying that the Trinity is an innovation introduced into Christian doctrine by the Alexandrian school, by the Neo-Platonists. Even if it must be admitted that the fathers of the Church studied Greek philosophy, it is nevertheless irrelevant here whence this doctrine has come. The question is simply whether it is true in and for itself; but this is not inquired into, although the dogma is the basis and principle of Christian religion.

If a majority of these theologians were compelled to state truthfully whether they consider the belief in the Trinity indispensably necessary for salvation, and whether they believe that its lack would lead to damnation, their answer cannot be doubtful.

Eternal salvation and eternal perdition, however, are words which are not to be used in polite society; they are considered *ἀπρόητα*, expressions which one would hesitate to use. There may be a disinclination to deny the fact, but it would be embarrassing [for those persons] to be compelled to give a plain affirma

tive answer. It will be found that the dogmas have become very much attenuated and shrunk in the doctrines of these theologians, even when there is an abundance of verbiage otherwise.

If we were to take for examination a large number of prayer-books, books of worship, or collections of sermons, in which it might be presumed that the principles of Christian religion are set forth, and if we were called upon to express judgment on the majority and to state whether in many of them the principles of Christianity find orthodox expression, without ambiguity and reserve, our answer could not be in the least doubtful.

The importance which the principal doctrines of positive Christianity otherwise possessed when they were still considered principal doctrines is never attached to them by the theologians (such as their general culture is) except when these doctrines appear in a mist of uncertainty and indefiniteness. Should philosophy ever have been considered an opponent of the dogmas of the Church, it can be an opponent no longer when in public opinion those dogmas to which it seemed pernicious are no longer valid. It should seem, therefore, as if there could no longer be any apprehension of danger in this direction from philosophy in its attempt to arrive at a comprehension of these dogmas through contemplation, and as if it might now approach them without fear since they have lost so much as objects of interest for the theologians.

2. THE HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE DOGMAS.

The most decided indication of the diminished importance of these dogmas may be found in the fact that we see them treated historically chiefly, and thereby represented as if they were convictions belonging to somebody else, as stories which do not represent events within the mind, and answer to none of its needs.

The whole interest seems to spend itself in studying the attitude of others toward these dogmas, and [in showing] how they came to assume it; those theologians study the contingent origin and form, but they marvel when they are asked the question what conviction they entertain themselves in regard to these dogmas.

This historical treatment slights the absolute origin which these dogmas have in the depths of our own mind, and thus disregards their necessity and truth for ourselves; it devotes much zeal and learning, not to the study of their content, but to that of the ex-

ternal features of the controversies which they called forth, and of the passions arising in connection with their growth. Theology assigns to itself a low enough place thereby. If there is to be no other but the historical conception of religion, those theologians who have not risen above that standpoint appear to us necessarily like clerks of some mercantile house, who keep account only of somebody else's wealth without having any property of their own; it is true that they receive a salary; but their sole merit is, that they serve others as recorders of their wealth. Such theology no longer stands on the ground of thought, it no longer occupies itself with the infinite thought in and for itself, but deals with it merely as a finite fact, an opinion or notion, etc. The truths with which history deals are those that *were*, that were for others, and not with truths which are the property of him who occupies himself with them. Those theologians do not attain to the true content, the cognition of God. They know as little of God as the blind man knows of the picture whose frame he has felt. All they know is how a certain dogma was framed by this or that council, what reasons the framers advanced, and how the one view or the other predominated. This is, indeed, connected with religion, but it is not an inquiry into religion itself. They give us ample information in regard to the history of the painter of a certain painting, in regard to the fate of the picture, in regard to the price it brought at various times, in regard to the hands through which it has passed, but they never afford us a look at the painting itself.

The main point in philosophy and religion is that the mind (*der Geist*) should enter into a direct communion with the highest interests; that it should not deal with them as if they were things alien to itself, but that it should discover in their essence its own content and hold itself worthy of attaining their cognition. Then only man will feel that his task is the cognition of the worth of his own spirit, and that he need not stand humbly outside and slyly sneak away [from this inquiry].

3. PHILOSOPHY AND IMMEDIATE COGNITION.

On account of the lack of content in the standpoint which we have been considering, it might appear that we have mentioned the objections which it raises against philosophy for the sole pur-

pose of stating in opposition to it our intention of seeking to cognize God, and thus of doing the opposite of that which it considers highest [wisdom]; but that standpoint has in its form a really rational interest for us. If we consider this form, we find that the recent position of theology is still more favorable to philosophy. For with the idea that all objective determinations converge and coalesce within the inwardness of subjectivity the conviction is connected that God reveals himself immediately in man, and that religion is man's immediate knowledge or cognition of God; this immediate cognition is called reason, or faith—using this word in another sense than that in which the Church uses it. This standpoint asserts that the basis of all conviction and piety is, that the consciousness of God is immediately present in the mind with the consciousness of itself.

a. This assertion, taking it in its direct sense and without attributing to it a polemic attitude toward philosophy, is looked upon as needing neither evidence nor proof. This general idea—which has at present become a prejudice—contains the quality or determination (*Bestimmung*) that the highest or religious content manifests itself in the spirit [of man], that Spirit manifests itself in spirit—namely, in my own spirit; and that this belief springs from my innermost individuality, of which it is the most inalienable part. It is therefore inseparable from the consciousness of pure spirit.

With the assertion that this knowledge is [not acquired but is present and] immediate in my soul, all external authority, all other or alien evidence is discarded. In order that anything should be valid for me, it must be credited and approved by my spirit; in order that I should believe, the evidence of my spirit is required. It may, for all that, originate externally, for the external origin means nothing in itself; but, if it is to be valid, such validity can rest on no other foundation except on that which is the basis of all truth—namely, on the testimony of spirit.

This principle is indeed the plain principle of philosophic cognition itself; and philosophy not only does not reject it, but considers it one of its own fundamental principles. Thus it may be considered a profit, a piece of good fortune that the fundamental principles of philosophy live in the general mind, and have become the general bias, in order that thereby the philosophic prin-

ciple may gain more easily the approbation of the educated and cultured in general. In this universal disposition of the times philosophy has gained not only external favor—it does not care for external advantages, and especially not where it and its teaching are institutions of the State—but it is favored intrinsically if its principle lives by its own force as a pre-supposition in the minds and hearts.

b. The principle of immediate cognition does not stop at this simple determinateness (*Bestimmtheit*), this unbiassed content; it does not confine itself to affirmation, but enters upon a polemic warfare against cognition, and, more particularly, against the cognition and comprehension of God. It is asserted not only that He must be believed in this manner and immediately known, nor is the proposition simply that our consciousness of God is connected with self-consciousness; but it is affirmed that our relation to God is such an immediate one only. The immediateness of [this] connection is taken in the sense of excluding the other determination, that of mediation, and, accordingly, it is asserted that philosophy, because it is mediated knowledge, is finite knowledge of the finite only.

Moreover, it is demanded that this immediateness of knowledge should rest satisfied with knowing that God exists, and refrain from seeking to know his nature. By this demand the content and substance of the idea of God is negated. The meaning of knowing or cognizing is not only that we know of an object that it exists, but also that we know its nature; and it means, further, that this knowledge of its nature consists of more than some simple information or certainty in regard to some qualities, but means that the cognition of its determinations, characteristics, and content is full and valid, so as to include the cognition of the necessity of the connection of these determinations.

A closer examination of the hypothesis of immediate cognition shows [that it implies] that consciousness is related in such a manner to its content that it and its content, [which is] God, are inseparable. It is this relation in general—namely, the knowledge of God and this inseparableness of consciousness from this content—that we call religion. This assertion involves, however, that we should stop at the contemplation of religion as such, or at the contemplation of the relation to God, and refrain from rising to

the cognition of God and of the divine content in its inherent essence.

In this sense it is asserted, further, we can know only our relation to God, but never God himself; our relation to God, alone, falls within the field of religion. This is the reason why so much is said at the present day about religion, and yet no one seeks to know what the nature of God is, or what God is in himself, and in what manner such nature should be determined. God, as such, is not made the [subject of] study; knowledge does not seek to grow and increase within this subject, and does not elucidate distinct determinations therein, so that God might be conceived as the relation of these determinations, and as self-relation. It is not God that is placed before us as the object of cognition, but solely our relation (*Beziehung*) to God, our connection (*Verhaeltniss*) with him; less and less is said about the nature of God, and only the demand remains that man should have religion, that he should be content with having it, and not proceed to the cognition of its divine content.

c. If we look at the gist of the theory of immediate cognition, at its direct meaning, [we shall find that] it expresses God in relation to consciousness, and maintains that this is an inseparable relation, or, in other words, that both must be considered together. This is, in the first place, an acknowledgment of the essential difference contained in the idea (*Begriff*) of religion, namely, subjective consciousness on one side, and God, as self-existing object (*Gegenstand an sich*), on the other. And it contains, in the second place, the assertion that there is an essential relation between the two, and that this inseparable relation of religion, and not our idea or opinion of God, is the main point of importance.

The true pith of this assertion is the philosophical idea itself, with this difference, that the latter is restricted, by the hypothesis of immediate cognition, to limits which philosophy removes, and whose one-sidedness and untruth it exposes. According to the philosophic conception, God is spirit and is concrete. If we now raise the question as to what Spirit is, [the answer must be given that] the fundamental principle of spirit is that of which the whole content of all religious doctrine is but the development and amplification. We may say for the present that [the characteristic of] spirit is to manifest itself, to exist for spirit. Spirit exists for

spirit, not in an external, contingent way, but it is spirit in so far only as it has existence for spirit; this constitutes the very idea of spirit. Or, to express it in a more theological form, God is essentially spirit when he is in his church. It has been said that the world, the sensuous universe, presupposes spectators and an existence for spirit; how much more must God exist for spirit.

For this reason our inquiry should not be a merely one-sided study of the subject, according to its finitude, or in its contingent life, but we should study it in as far as it has the infinite and absolute object for its content. For, when the subject is considered in itself, it is considered in finite knowledge, within the knowledge of the finite. It is likewise asserted that God, on the other side, should not be considered by himself, since God is known only in relation to consciousness. But the unity and inseparableness of both determinations, of the cognition of God and of self-consciousness, presuppose in themselves that which is meant by the word identity, and the assertion therefore implies in itself that identity which it dreads.

Thus we see that the fundamental principle of philosophy appears as a general element which permeates the culture of the times, and it is evident here also that philosophy, in its form, is not above the times by differing absolutely from their general determinateness [or character]. On the contrary, one spirit permeates reality as well as philosophic thinking, although the latter remains the true self-comprehension of reality. It is one and the same movement which underlies the times and their philosophy, the only difference being that the determinateness [or character] of the times seems to exist contingently merely, without [rational] justification, and that it may stand therefore in an irreconciled, hostile relation to its truly essential content, while philosophy, on the contrary, is a justification of the principle, and for this reason is general pacification and conciliation. Similar to the reduction by which the Protestant (lutherische = Lutheran) Reformation led faith back to the basis of the first centuries, the principle of immediate cognition has reduced Christian knowledge to first elements. At a first glance, the result of this reduction seems to be the dissipation of the essential content; but philosophy has stepped in, and, recognizing that this principle of immediate cog-

nition is itself the content, it **proceeds** to unfold it in its true development within itself.

The naïve simplicity of this opposition to philosophy is unlimited. Those very assertions which are put forth to militate against philosophy, and which seem to embody the most pointedly hostile argument, are found, upon a closer inspection of their content, to be in harmony with what they are intended to oppose. The result of an inspection and study of philosophy, on the other hand, renders those partition-walls, which have been reared in order to bring about absolute division, transparent, and, looking through them, we see harmony where we expected to find the greatest possible contrast.

LEIBNITZ'S CRITIQUE OF LOCKE.

BEING A TRANSLATION FROM THE FRENCH OF LEIBNITZ BY ALFRED G. LANGLEY.

NEW ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

The text adopted as the basis of this translation is that of C. J. Gerhardt, in his "Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz," Berlin, 1875-'82, of which up to the present time Vols. I, II, IV, and V have appeared, Vol. V containing the "Nouveaux Essais." For the use of this edition I am indebted to the courtesy of Harvard College Library. The texts of Erdmann (J. E.), "Leibnitii Opera Philosophica," Berlin, 1839-'40, and of Jacques (M. A.), "Œuvres de Leibniz," Paris, 1842, have also been consulted. The edition of the philosophical writings by P. Janet, two vols., Paris, 1866, I have not seen. These, with that of Raspe (R. E.), Amsterdam and Leipsic, 1765, which has been used by the subsequent editors, are the only known editions of the philosophical works.

The three texts of which I have made use differ very little from one another in the chapter translated. The variations, so far as I have noticed them, are chiefly verbal, and do not essentially, if at all, modify the thought. The only important difference in the